Daniel Schorr and the "Downing Street Memo"

I am not much of a conspiracy theorist. If anything, a conspiracy would have to hit me in the nose before I'd believe that I even had a nose.

With that said, I found myself warily listening to the wonderings of long-time NPR (National Public Radio) political commentator Daniel Schorr this morning as he waxed concerned about the lack of media coverage in America regarding the wildly popular (in Britain) Downing Street Memo recently printed in The London Times. The memo apparently inflicts major damage on both President Bush's and Prime Minister Tony Blair's contentions that Iraq was not a target of war as early as their critics suggest.

But the leaked confidential memo reportedly drafted by a Downing Street policy aide "proves" that Washington and Blair were "sexing up" intelligence reports and other vital materials regarding Iraq as much as a year before things allegedly got going. It's not a stretch to think Bush and Blair did in fact do such a thing; as it is not a stretch to think that they did not do such a thing.

However, Daniel Schorr's lament, or perhaps it is a rebuke, that the American press has been strangely silent, and the American people's appetite curiously sated, regarding this British grenade-of-a-memo is a lament that is wildly out of place. Why? Because the American people, news consumers most, and the media that feed them, do not trust memos anymore, particularly memos that seem too perfect and too perfectly damning of the President of the United States. This, it is sad to say, is the deleterious consequence of the 60 Minutes reports last year in which forged documents were used to impugn a sitting president.

Remember that colossal embarrassment? Remember where the truth was found, where it was reported? It was found and reported in the Blogosphere, as numerous bloggers' scepticism and skill uncovered the problems of Rathergate.

Now comes this meatball of a pitch in the form of a Downing Street memo, and everyone, at least to Daniel Schorr, should be ready to smash it out of the park. But I'll bet most Americans can't hit that pitch, precisely because they expect at any moment it is going to take a dive into the dirt.

Take a look at the memo for yourself. It IS a doozy, so to speak. But it is such a doozy that one can't help but be sceptical. And if I were to voice my doubts, it would be on the following facts, observed solely by me, as far as I know, but no doubt being observed by countless bloggers:

A) How is it that a TOP SECRET (Super-duper decoder-ring secret) document is addressed to David Manning, the British ambassador in Washington, but it is NOT addressed to SIR David Manning, when in fact, Sir Manning is so knighted? Moreover, how is it that the carbon-copy addressees include SIR Richard Wilson, a man aptly addressed as SIR though there is no such formality for the rather bland "David Manning" to whom the memo is FORMALLY addressed? Or do I misunderstand British correspondence and titles?

B) How is it that a memo re: intelligence and Iraq War planning and similar material is so secret, and yet it is forwarded to, among others, Tony Blair's press secretary?

C) How is it that the co-addresses include the "Attorney-General" when the Attorney General of Britain, according to his own webpage and countless references easily pulled up on Google, does not include a hyphen in his title?

D) Check out this quote from the memo: "Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN." (Regarding inspections, etc.) Do Englishmen use this expression, play "hard-ball"? Is that not a reference to American baseball? Or is there a softball cricket league in London's suburbs I know nothing about?

E) Check out the following excerpts:

"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justfied by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

Besides this quote being nearly perfectly damnable of the Bush administration, with its PERFECT sentence "But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," what do you think of the verb tense? If a memo is drafted to describe what is recently and/or currently being planned, would it not be MORE likely that the writer would say "The intelligence and facts ARE being fixed" rather than the far less perfect "WERE being fixed"? Also, does anyone believe that the NSC had "no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record"? Excuse me? Is this a suggestion that Saddam Hussein's regime was so sterling, or so recently polished, that the NSC should have been shouting its praises from the rooftops; or that the NSC was reluctant to report on Saddam's contrite and compassionate heart?

"It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. ...We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would
also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

Again, do you buy that "It SEEMED clear that Bush HAD made up his mind" instead of a more vital, current, and immediate "It SEEMS clear Bush HAS made up his mind"? How about "Saddam WAS not threatening?" Shouldn't that be "Saddam IS NOT threatening?" Come now, this memo is allegedly a couple of days after the fact, and that plans to attack Iraq are still in process. The verb tense is suspicious.

"Conclusions: (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options. ... " Again, please note the verb tenses. "We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions, [etc.]" Shouldn't that read "We should work on the assumption that the UK WILL take part ... But we NEED a fuller picture before we CAN take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US ... we ARE considering ..."?

OK. You get the picture. I am not suggesting that the memo is forged. I am saying that there are reasons for being sceptical. First, the internal criticism of the memo leads to lots of questions, not least of which is "Who actually wrote this, when, and why is it so strange, and so strangely and suspiciously perfect (and yet it is imperfect in many ways)?" Second, the memo is incredible, at least a bit, because of the fallout left by the Rathergate scandal. Yes, the memo is allegedly drafted by Downing Street aide Matthew Rycroft. Yes, apparently neither the Bush administration nor the Blair government have commented about its validity or invalidity. But should we just accept its validity prima facie because it is "leaked" or "telling"?

Hence, my conclusion: Daniel Schorr, who seems to have avoided any detailed scrutiny of the memo, might want to look inward as to why the public is not inflamed by the insinuations of this memo. And he might look at the methods of his colleagues in the glorious profession in which he works who have corrupted or sullied the process of fact-finding, reporting, and self-analysis.

We indeed are sceptical. But this memo does not help us find our way to more certain grounds.

Contratimes

©Bill Gnade 2005/Contratimes - All Rights Reserved

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[To hear Mr. Schorr's commentary, go to http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4661884]