Criticism is leveled at Mr. Rumsfeld largely because of his failure to deliver sufficient troops to Iraq, and his failure to properly estimate the power of the insurgency which followed the desposing of Saddam Hussein. The bulk of the criticism, coming from a handful (less than a dozen) of the hundreds of generals serving in the military, falls in the wake of Mr. Rumsfeld's immediate call, when he took the helm of the Dept. of Defense, that the defense monolith needed streamlining and more civilian (and less military) control.
Attentive readers know that the curious aspect of this story is partly found in the sudden elation of liberal critics of war and all things military who now seemingly adore this sort of military intelligence. Suddenly generals are good things! At least, this kind of general is wonderful. And what kind of general is that? Let me guess: It's the general critical of the Bush Administration. But I am only guessing.
Here is the criticism in a nutshell: That the insurgency could have been more thoroughly suppressed if the Secretary had not been enamored of a swift, mobile and streamlined military strike force, nor had he possessed a child's silly fascination of smart weapons; that things would be more stable in Iraq had the Secretary not disbanded the Iraqi Army assembled under the Hussein regime; that the "peace" would have been better managed had he deployed more troops to fully control and repress those who resisted democratic reform.
And here is the reality: If Rumsfeld had indeed done things differently, we would now be hearing this sort of criticism from a different set of generals:
- With so many troops in Iraq, far more than necessary in the era of smart weapons and high-tech warfare, the Secretary unwittingly created more targets for the insurgents. With far fewer troops in the hot zones, soldiers could have been moved swiftly, stealthily; providing far fewer opportunities for insurgents to inflict damage on American and allied troops with IEDs and other guerrilla tactics. Thousands of American lives could have been spared had there been fewer troops on the ground.
- With so many troops in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld created an atmosphere of oppression and hostility: The Iraqi people have felt oppressed and intimidated by a force that can only be described as occupiers. The Iraqi people have effectively been rendered superfluous in their own struggles for reform: What they are witnessing is exactly that, something they are witnessing and not a process in which they are participating. Smaller troop numbers would mollify Iraqi anger and discouragement.
- With the cumbersome and overstuffed military presence in Iraq, command and control of tactical and strategic objectives have been confusing and slow; and the excessive presence of troops on the ground has made the use of air-to-ground tactical weapons more difficult. Moreover, collateral damage numbers would have been lower with a smaller military presence, since the larger units have limited the use of precision weaponry, limited by fears of casualties due to 'friendly-fire.' In fact, 'friendly-fire' casualties are at the highest levels since the war began.
We all know this to be true, and that is why this story is curious and not a story at all. Interestingly those leftists critical of the military are unable to find a friend in Mr. Rumsfeld, which is an odd thing indeed: Rumsfeld is a civilian who has made every effort to bring the Defense Department under the control of the people, by the people. Apparently he should have just let the military run itself, under the authority of certain generals, which is, I guess, a leftist––even a Democratic Party––ideal.
Peace.
©Bill Gnade 2006/Contratimes - All Rights Reserved.
Technorati tags: Rumsfeld, Iraq, Insurgency
1 comment:
Oh, right on! My thoughts are along the same lines...
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